PSARC 2007/601 FastTrack timeout 12/05/2007 - "spec.txt" added to the materials directory

[Gary Winiger]

> From David.Chieu at sun.com Thu Dec  6 14:54:30 2007
> Date: Thu, 06 Dec 2007 14:54:44 -0800
> From: David Chieu <David.Chieu at sun.com>
> Subject: Re: PSARC 2007/601 FastTrack timeout 12/05/2007 - "spec.txt" added to
>  the materials directory
> To: Gary Winiger <gww at eng.sun.com>
> Cc: psarc-ext at sun.com, intel-amt-iteam at sun.com
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> 
> Gary Winiger wrote:
> > ...
> > 	Team, thanks for the excellent update.  Still a few open questions:
> >
> > 	* Other than the IOCTL, I've missed seeing interface taxonomies.
> > 	* I've also missed seeing the release binding.
> > 	* What's the set of exported interface?
> >   
> The interface taxonomy for the IOCTLs is "project private", release 
> binding: micro/patch.
> Other than that there's no other exported interface. The users are 
> directly talking
> to the firmware which is AMT's real interface-provider. This project 
> only provides
> an HTTP(s) service on TCP port 16992/16993 to relay the messages to/from 
> the firmware.
> > 	* 5.6-5.8 seem incomplete to me.  What privileges?  What Rights
> > 	  Profiles, and why?  Perhaps more explicitly, what's the
> > 	  method_context of svc:/network/lms and how does this proposed
> > 	  service comply to the SMF policy:
> > 	  http://opensolaris.org/os/community/arc/policies/SMF-policy/
> > 	  (which unfortunately is 2 revs behind the internal
> > 	  http://sac.eng/cgi-bin/bp.cgi?NAME=SMF.bp)
> > 	  Yes I'm sending John email once again ;-{
> >   
> The method_context section of LMS includes a limited set of privileges:
> basic,sys_net_config,net_rawaccess
> This is to grant LMS the rights to open /dev/heci and send IOCTLs.
> 
> A new authorization "solaris.smf.manage.lms" will be defined and listed 
> under the
> "Network Management" profile in /etc/security/prof_attr. Using RBAC, 
> Only users with the
> "solaris.smf.manage.lms" authorization can enable/disable the LMS service.
> > 	* 6.15 " is there any way for other software in the system ...
> > 	  that a given network interface is running AMT?"
> > 	  Answer:  "It *should* be possible ..."
> > 	  will this be done?
> >   
> Lacking hardware related information from Intel, this will not be done 
> in phase I. However, it's added to the plan for Phase II. Good catch.
> > 	* 7 "? Remotely Protect Computing Assets : Through Out of Band
> > 	  communication, each system's software version numbers are checked
> > 	  and, if necessary, system software and virus protection are
> > 	  remotely updated with the most recent patches and virus definitions.
> > 	  Viruses and worms can also be contained at their source, if needed,
> > 	  by means of built-in circuit-breaker functionality.
> >
> > 	  "Intel AMT infrastructure supports the creation of setup and
> > 	  configuration interfaces for management applications, as well
> > 	  as network, security, and storage administration."
> >
> > 	  What does this mean relative to this project?  How are Solaris
> > 	  veriion numbers (service tags ;-) being checked?  How is Solaris
> > 	  system software and virus protection being remotely updated
> > 	  with the most recent patches and virus definitions?
> >
> > Gary..
> >   
> This project currently does not deliver these features for phase I. But 
> after the integration of
> this project will work with ISVs (i.e. anti-virus vendors, etc.) to add 
> the above mentioned feature.
> The implementation detail is TDB. However, we realize/document the 
> following AMT capabilities
> e.g.
> Remote software version checking/updating can be done by the using the 
> EEPROM
> named 3PDS (3rd Party Data Storage), and share it with remote management 
> console.
> See 6.18 about StorageRealm.
> 
> -- The Solaris AMT team
> 
!v